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Abstract
We use a panel data set that combines annual brand-level advertising expenditures for over three hundred brands with measures of brand awareness
and perceived quality from a large-scale consumer survey to study the effect
of advertising. Advertising is modeled as a dynamic investment in a brand’s
stocks of awareness and perceived quality and we ask how such an investment
changes brand awareness and quality perceptions. Our panel data allow us to
control for unobserved heterogeneity across brands and to identify the effect
of advertising from the time-series variation within brands. They also allow
us to account for the endogeneity of advertising through recently developed
dynamic panel data estimation techniques. We find that advertising has consistently a significant positive effect on brand awareness but no significant effect
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Introduction

In 2006 more than $280 billion were spent on advertising in the U.S., well above 2% of
GDP. By investing in advertising, marketers aim to encourage consumers to choose
their brand. For a consumer to choose a brand, two conditions must be satisfied:
First, the brand must be in her choice set. Second, the brand must be preferred over
all the other brands in her choice set. Advertising may facilitate one or both of these
conditions.
In this research we empirically investigate how advertising affects these two conditions. To disentangle the impact on choice set from that on preferences, we use
actual measures of the level of information possessed by consumers about a large
number of brands and of their quality perceptions. We compile a panel data set that
combines annual brand-level advertising expenditures with data from a large-scale
consumer survey, in which respondents were asked to indicate whether they were
aware of different brands and, if so, to rate them in terms of quality. These data offer
the unique opportunity to study the role of advertising for a wide range of brands
across a number of different product categories.
The awareness score measures how well consumers are informed about the existence and the availability of a brand and hence captures directly the extent to which
the brand is part of consumers’ choice sets. The quality rating measures the degree
of subjective vertical product differentiation in the sense that consumers are led to
perceive the advertised brand as being better. Hence, our data allow us to investigate the relationship between advertising and two important dimensions of consumer
knowledge. The behavioral literature in marketing has highlighted the same two dimensions in the form of the size of the consideration set and the relative strength of
preferences (Nedungadi 1990, Mitra & Lynch 1995). It is, of course, possible that advertising also affects other aspects of consumer knowledge. For example, advertising
may generate some form of subjective horizontal product differentiation that is unlikely to be reflected in either brand awareness or perceived quality. In a recent paper
Erdem, Keane & Sun (2008), however, report that advertising focuses on horizontal
attributes only for one out of the 19 brands examined.
Understanding the channel through which advertising affects consumer choice is
important for researchers and practitioners alike for several reasons. For example, Sutton’s (1991) bounds on industry concentration in large markets implicitly assume that
advertising increases consumers’ willingness to pay by altering quality perceptions.
While profits increase in perceived quality, they may decrease in brand awareness
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(Fershtman & Muller 1993, Boyer & Moreaux 1999), thereby stalling the competitive
escalation in advertising at the heart of the endogenous sunk cost theory. Moreover,
Doraszelski & Markovich (2007) show that even in small markets industry dynamics
can be very different depending on the nature of advertising. From an empirical perspective, when estimating a demand model, advertising could be modeled as affecting
the choice set or as affecting the utility that the consumer derives from a brand. If the
role of advertising is mistakenly specified as affecting quality perceptions (i.e., preferences) rather than brand awareness as it often is, then the estimated parameters
may be biased. In her study of the U.S. personal computer industry, Sovinsky Goeree
(2008) finds that traditional demand models overstate price elasticities because they
assume that consumers are aware of – and hence choose among – all brands in the
market when in actuality most consumers are aware of only a small fraction of brands.
For our empirical analysis we develop a dynamic estimation framework. Brand
awareness and perceived quality are naturally viewed as stocks that are built up
over time in response to advertising (Nerlove & Arrow 1962). At the same time,
these stocks depreciate as consumers forget past advertising campaigns or as an old
campaign is superseded by a new campaign. Advertising can thus be thought of
as an investment in brand awareness and perceived quality. The dynamic nature of
advertising leads us to a dynamic panel data model. In estimating this model we
confront two important problems, namely unobserved heterogeneity across brands
and the potential endogeneity of advertising. We discuss these below.
When estimating the effect of advertising across brands we need to keep in mind
that they are different in many respects. Unobserved factors that affect both advertising expenditures and the stocks of perceived quality and awareness may lead to
spurious positive estimates of the effect of advertising. Put differently, if we detect an
effect of advertising, then we cannot be sure if this effect is causal in the sense that
higher advertising expenditures lead to higher brand awareness and perceived quality
or if it is spurious in the sense that different brands have different stocks of perceived
quality and awareness as well as advertising expenditures. For example, although in
our data the brands in the fast food category on average have high advertising and
high awareness and the brands in the cosmetics and fragrances category have low advertising and low awareness, we cannot infer that advertising boosts awareness. We
can only conclude that the relationship between advertising expenditures, perceived
quality, and brand awareness differs from category to category or even from brand to
brand.
Much of the existing literature uses cross-sectional data to discern a relationship
3

between advertising expenditures and perceived quality (e.g., Kirmani & Wright 1989,
Kirmani 1990, Moorthy & Zhao 2000, Moorthy & Hawkins 2005) in an attempt to
test the idea that consumers draw inferences about the brand’s quality from the
amount that is spent on advertising it (Nelson 1974, Milgrom & Roberts 1986, Tellis
& Fornell 1988). With cross-sectional data it is difficult to account for unobserved
heterogeneity across brands. Indeed, if we neglect permanent differences between
brands, then we find that both brand awareness and perceived quality are positively
correlated with advertising expenditures, thereby replicating the earlier studies. Once
we make full use of our panel data and account for unobserved heterogeneity, however,
the effect of advertising expenditures on perceived quality disappears.1
Our estimation equations are dynamic relationships between a brand’s current
stocks of perceived quality and awareness on the left-hand side and the brand’s previous stocks of perceived quality and awareness as well as its own and its rivals’
advertising expenditures on the right-hand side. In this context, endogeneity arises
for two reasons. First, the lagged dependent variables are by construction correlated
with all past error terms and therefore endogenous. As a consequence, traditional
fixed-effect methods are necessarily inconsistent.2 Second, advertising expenditures
may also be endogenous for economic reasons. For instance, media coverage such as
news reports may affect brand awareness and perceived quality beyond the amount
spent on advertising. To the extent that these shocks to the stocks of perceived quality and awareness of a brand feed back into decisions about advertising, say because
the brand manager opts to advertise less if a news report has generated sufficient
awareness, they give rise to an endogeneity problem.
To resolve the endogeneity problem we use the dynamic panel data methods developed by Arellano & Bond (1991), Arellano & Bover (1995), and Blundell & Bond
(1998). The key advantage is that these methods do not rely on the availability of
strictly exogenous explanatory variables or instruments. This is an appealing methodology that has been widely applied (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson 2001, Durlauf, Johnson & Temple 2005, Zhang & Li 2007) because valid instruments are often hard to
come by. Further, since these methods involve first differencing, they allow us to control for unobserved factors that affect both advertising expenditures and the stocks
1

Another way to get around this issue is to take an experimental approach, as in Mitra & Lynch
(1995).
2
This source of endogeneity is not tied to advertising in particular; rather it always arises in
estimating dynamic relationships in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. An exception is the
(rather unusual) panel-data setting where one has T → ∞ instead of N → ∞. In this case the
within-groups estimator is consistent (Bond 2002, p. 5).
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of perceived quality and awareness and may lead to spurious positive estimates of the
effect of advertising. In addition, our approach allows for factors other than advertising to affect a brand’s stock of perceived quality and awareness to the extent that
these factors are constant over time.
Our main finding is that advertising expenditures have a significant positive effect on brand awareness but no significant effect on perceived quality. These results appear to be robust across a wide range of specifications. Since awareness
is the most basic kind of information a consumer can have for a brand, we conclude that an important role of advertising is information provision. On the other
hand, our results indicate that advertising is not likely to alter consumers’ quality
perceptions. This conclusion calls for a reexamination of the implicit assumption
underlying Sutton’s (1991) endogenous sunk cost theory. It also suggests that advertising should be modeled as affecting the choice set and not just utility when
estimating demand. Finally, our findings lend empirical support to the view that advertising is generally procompetitive because it disseminates information about the
existence, the price, and the attributes of products more widely among consumers
(Stigler 1961, Telser 1964, Nelson 1970, Nelson 1974).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we explain
the dynamic investment model and the corresponding empirical strategy. In Section 4
we describe the data and in Section 5 we present the results of the empirical analysis.
Section 6 concludes.

2

Model Specification

We develop an empirical model based on the classic advertising-as-investment model
of Nerlove & Arrow (1962). Related empirical models are the basis of current research
on advertising (e.g., Naik, Mantrala & Sawyer 1998, Dube, Hitsch & Manchanda
2005, Doganoglu & Klapper 2006, Bass, Bruce, Majumdar & Murthi 2007). Naik
et al. (1998), in particular, find that the Nerlove & Arrow (1962) model provides a
better fit than other models that have been proposed in the literature such as Vidale
& Wolfe (1957), Brandaid (Little 1975), Tracker (Blattberg & Golanty 1978), and
Litmus (Blackburn & Clancy 1982).
We extend the Nerlove & Arrow (1962) framework in two respects. First, we allow
a brand’s stocks of awareness and perceived quality to be affected by the advertising
of its competitors. This approach captures the idea that advertising takes place in
a competitive environment where brands vie for the attention of consumers. The
5

advertising of competitors may also be beneficial to a brand if it draws attention
to the entire category and thus expands the relevant market for the brand (e.g.,
Nedungadi 1990, Kadiyali 1996). Second, we allow for a stochastic component in the
effect of advertising on the stocks of awareness and perceived quality to reflect the
success or failure of an advertising campaign and other unobserved influences such as
the creative quality of the advertising copy, media selection, or scheduling.
More formally, we let Qit be the stock of perceived quality of brand i at the
start of period t and Ait the stock of its awareness. We further let Eit−1 denote the
advertising expenditures of brand i over the course of period t − 1 and E−it−1 =
(E1t−1 , . . . , Ei−1t−1 , Ei+1t−1 , . . . , Ent−1 ) the advertising expenditures of its competitors. Then, at the most general level, the stocks of perceived quality and awareness
of brand i evolve over time according to the laws of motion
Qit = git (Qit−1 , Eit−1 , E−it−1 , εit ),
Ait = hit (Ait−1 , Eit−1 , E−it−1 , εit ),
where git (·) and hit (·) are brand- and time-specific functions. The idiosyncratic error
εit captures the success or failure of an advertising campaign along with all other
omitted factors. For example, the quality of the advertising campaign may matter
just as much as the amount spent on it. By recursively substituting for the lagged
stocks of perceived quality and awareness we can write the current stocks as functions
of all past advertising expenditures and the current and all past error terms. This
shows that these shocks to brand awareness and perceived quality are persistent over
time. For example, the effect of a particularly good (or bad) advertising campaign
may linger and be felt for some time to come.
We model the effect of competitors’ advertising on brand awareness and perceived
quality in two ways. First, we consider a brand’s “share of voice.” We use its
advertising expenditures, Eit−1 , relative to the average amount spent on advertising
by rival brands in the brand’s subcategory or category, E −it−1 .3 To the extent that
brands compete with each other for the attention of consumers, a brand may have
to outspend its rivals to cut through the clutter. If so, then what is important
may not be the absolute amount spent on advertising but the amount relative to
rival brands. Second, we consider the amount of advertising in the entire market
3

The Brandweek Superbrands survey reports on only the top brands (in terms of sales) in each
subcategory or category. The number of brands varies from 3 for some subcategories to 10 for others.
We therefore use the average, rather than the sum, of competitors’ advertising.

6

by including the average amount spent on advertising by rival brands in the brand’s
subcategory or category. Advertising is market expanding if it attracts consumers to
the entire category but not necessarily to a particular brand. In this way, competitors’
advertising may have a positive influence on, say, brand awareness.
Taken together, our estimation equations are
Qit = µi + λt + γQit−1 + f (Eit−1 , E −it−1 ) + εit ,

(1)

Ait = µi + λt + γAit−1 + f (Eit−1 , E −it−1 ) + εit .

(2)

Here µi is a brand effect that captures unobserved heterogeneity across brands and
λt is a time effect to control for possible systematic changes over time. The time
effect may capture, for example, that consumers are systematically informed about
a larger number of brands due to the advent of the internet and other alternative
media channels. Through the brand effect we allow for factors other than advertising
to affect a brand’s stocks of perceived quality and awareness to the extent that these
factors are constant over time. For example, consumers may hear about a brand and
their quality perceptions may be affected by word of mouth. Similarly, it may well be
the case that consumers in the process of purchasing a brand become more informed
about it and that their quality perceptions change, especially for high-involvement
brands. Prior to purchasing a car, say, many consumers engage in research about
the set of available cars and their respective characteristics, including quality ratings
from sources such as car magazines and Consumer Reports. If these effects do not
vary over time, then we fully account for them in our estimation because the dynamic
panel data methods we employ involve first differencing.
The parameter γ measures how much of last period’s stocks of perceived quality
and awareness are carried forward into this period’s stocks; 1 − γ can therefore be
interpreted as the rate of depreciation of these stocks. Note that in the estimation we
allow all parameters to be different across our estimation equations. For example, we
do not presume that the carryover rates for perceived quality and brand awareness
are the same.
The function f (·) represents the response of brand awareness and perceived quality
to the advertising expenditures of the brand and potentially also those of its rivals.
In the simplest case absent competition we specify this function as
2
f (Eit−1 ) = β1 Eit−1 + β2 Eit−1
.
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This functional form is flexible in that it allows for a nonlinear effect of advertising
expenditures but does not impose one. Later on in Section 5.6 we demonstrate the
robustness of our results by considering a number of additional functional forms. To
account for competition in the share-of-voice specification, we set
µ
f (Eit−1 , E −it−1 ) = β1

Eit−1
E −it−1

¶

µ
+ β2

Eit−1
E −it−1

¶2

and in the total-advertising specification, we set
2
f (Eit−1 , E −it−1 ) = β1 Eit−1 + β2 Eit−1
+ β3 E −it−1 .

3

Estimation Strategy

Equations (1) and (2) are dynamic relationships that feature lagged dependent variables on the right-hand side. When estimating, we confront the problems of unobserved heterogeneity across brands and the endogeneity of advertising.
In our panel-data setting, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is akin to dropping
the brand effect µi from equations (1) and (2) and then estimating them by ordinary
least squares. Since this approach relies on both cross-sectional and time-series variation to identify the effect of advertising, we refer to it as “pooled OLS”(POLS) in
what follows.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity we include a brand effect µi and use
the within estimator that treats µi as a fixed effect. We follow the usual convention
in microeconomic applications that the term “fixed effect” does not necessarily mean
that the effect is being treated as nonrandom; rather it means that we are allowing for
arbitrary correlation between the unobserved brand effect and the observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002, p. 251). The within estimator eliminates the brand
effect by subtracting the within-brand mean from equations (1) and (2). Hence, the
identification of the slope parameters that determine the effect of advertising relies
solely on variation over time within brands; the information in the between-brand
cross-sectional relationship is not used. We refer to this approach as “fixed effects”
(FE).
While FE accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, it suffers from an endogeneity
problem. In our panel-data setting, endogeneity arises for two reasons. First, since
equations (1) and (2) are inherently dynamic, the lagged stocks of perceived quality
and awareness may be endogenous. More formally, Qit−1 and Ait−1 are by construc8

tion correlated with εis for s < t. The within estimator subtracts the within-brand
mean from equations (1) and (2). The resulting regressor, say Qit−1 − Qi in the case
of perceived quality, is correlated with the error term εit − εi since εi contains εit−1
along with all higher-order lags. Hence, FE is necessarily inconsistent. Second, advertising expenditures may also be endogenous for economic reasons. For instance,
media coverage such as news reports may directly affect brand awareness and perceived quality. Our model treats media coverage other than advertising as shocks
to the stocks of perceived quality and awareness. To the extent that these shocks
feed back into decisions about advertising, say because the brand manager opts to
advertise less if a news report has generated sufficient awareness, they give rise to
an endogeneity problem. More formally, it is reasonable to assume that Eit−1 , the
advertising expenditures of brand i over the course of period t − 1, are chosen at
the beginning of period t − 1 with knowledge of εit−1 and higher-order lags and that
therefore Eit−1 is correlated with εis for s < t.
We apply the dynamic panel-data method proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991) to
deal with both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. This methodology has the
advantage that it does not rely on the availability of strictly exogenous explanatory
variables or instruments. This is welcome because instruments are often hard to
come by, especially in panel-data settings: The problem is finding a variable that
is a good predictor of advertising expenditures and is uncorrelated with shocks to
brand awareness and perceived quality; finding a variable that is a good predictor of
lagged brand awareness and perceived quality and uncorrelated with current shocks to
brand awareness and perceived quality is even less obvious. The key idea of Arellano
& Bond (1991) is that if the error terms are serially uncorrelated, then lagged values of
the dependent variable and lagged values of the endogenous right-hand-side variables
represent valid instruments.
To see this, take first differences of equation (1) to obtain
Qit − Qit−1 = (λt − λt−1 ) + γ(Qit−1 − Qit−2 ) + (f (Eit−1 ) − f (Eit−2 )) + (εit − εit−1 ), (3)
where we abstract from competition to simplify the notation. Eliminating the brand
effect µi accounts for unobserved heterogeneity between brands. The remaining problem with estimating equation (3) by least-squares is that Qit−1 − Qit−2 is by construction correlated with εit −εit−1 since Qit−1 is correlated with εit−1 by virtue of equation
(1). Moreover, as we have discussed above, Eit−1 may also be correlated with εit−1
for economic reasons.
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We take advantage of the fact that we have observations on a number of periods
in order to come up with instruments for the endogenous variables. In particular,
this is possible starting in the third period where equation (3) becomes
Qi3 − Qi2 = (λ3 − λ2 ) + γ(Qi2 − Qi1 ) + (f (Ei2 ) − f (Ei1 )) + (εi3 − εi2 ).
In this case Qi1 is a valid instrument for (Qi2 − Qi1 ) since it is correlated with
(Qi2 − Qi1 ) but uncorrelated with (εi3 − εi2 ) and, similarly, Ei1 is a valid instrument
for (f (Ei2 ) − f (Ei1 )). In the fourth period Qi1 and Qi2 are both valid instruments
since neither is correlated with (εi4 − εi3 ) and, similarly, Ei1 and Ei2 are both valid
instruments. In general, for lagged dependent variables and for endogenous righthand-side variables, levels of these variables that are lagged two or more periods are
valid instruments. This allows us to generate more instruments for later periods. The
resulting estimator is referred to as “difference GMM” (DGMM).
A potential difficulty with the DGMM estimator is that lagged levels may be poor
instruments for first differences when the underlying variables are highly persistent
over time. Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) propose an augmented estimator in which the original equations in levels are added to the system.
The idea is to create a stacked data set containing differences and levels and then to
instrument differences with levels and levels with differences. The required assumption is that brand effects are uncorrelated with changes in advertising expenditures.
This estimator is commonly referred to as “system GMM” (SGMM). In Section 5 we
report and compare results for DGMM and SGMM.
It is important to test the validity of the instruments proposed above. Following
Arellano & Bond (1991) we report a Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions.
This test examines whether the instruments are jointly exogenous. We also report the
so-called difference-in-Hansen J test to examine specifically whether the additional
instruments for the level equations used in SGMM (but not in DGMM) are valid.
Arellano & Bond (1991) further develop a test for second-order serial correlation
in the first differences of the error terms. As described above, both GMM estimators
require that the levels of the error terms be serially uncorrelated, implying that the
first differences are serially correlated of at most first order. We caution the reader
that the test for second-order serial correlation is formally only defined if the number
of periods in the sample is greater than or equal to 5 whereas we observe a brand on
average for just 4.2 periods in our application.
Our preliminary estimates suggest that the error terms are unlikely to be serially
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uncorrelated as required by Arellano & Bond (1991). The AR(2) test described above
indicates first-order serial correlation in the error terms. An AR(3) test for thirdorder serial correlation in the first differences of the error terms, however, indicates
the absence of second-order serial correlation in the error terms.4 In this case, Qit−2
and Eit−2 are no longer valid instruments for equation (3). Intuitively, because Qit−2
is correlated with εit−2 by virtue of equation (1) and εit−2 is correlated with εit−1
by first-order serial correlation, Qit−2 is correlated with εit−1 in equation (3), and
similarly for Eit−2 . Fortunately, however, Qit−3 and Eit−3 remain valid instruments
because εit−3 is uncorrelated with εit−1 .
We carry out the DGMM and SGMM estimation using STATA’s xtabond2 routine (Roodman 2007). We enter third and higher lags of either brand awareness or
perceived quality, together with third and higher lags of advertising expenditures
as instruments. In addition to these “GMM-style” instruments, for the difference
equations we enter the time dummies as “IV-style” instruments. We also apply
the finite-sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) which corrects for the
two-step covariance matrix and substantially increases the efficiency of both GMM
estimators. Finally, we compute standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity
and arbitrary patterns of serial correlation within brands.

4

Data

Our data are derived from the Brandweek Superbrands surveys from 2000 to 2005.
Each year’s survey lists the top brands in terms of sales during the past year from 25
broad categories. Inside these categories are often a number of more narrowly defined
subcategories. Table 1 lists the categories along with their subcategories. The surveys
report perceived quality and awareness scores for the current year and the advertising
expenditures for the previous year by brand.
Perceived quality and awareness scores are calculated by Harris Interactive in
their Equitrend brand-equity study. Each year Harris Interactive surveys online between 20, 000 and 45, 000 consumers aged 15 years and older in order to determine
their perceptions of a brand’s quality and its level of awareness for approximately
1, 000 brands.5 To ensure that the respondents accurately reflect the general pop4

Of course, the AR(3) test uses less observations than the AR(2) test and is therefore also less
powerful.
5
The exact wording of the question is: “We will display for you a list of brands and we are asking
you to rate the overall quality of each brand using a 0 to 10 scale, where ‘0’ means ‘Unacceptable/Poor
Quality’, ‘5’ means ‘Quite Acceptable Quality’ and ‘10’ means ‘Outstanding/Extraordinary Quality’.
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1. Apparel
2. Appliances
3. Automobiles
a. general automobiles
b. luxury
c. subcompact
d. sedan/wagon
e. trucks/suvs/vans
4. Beer, Wine, Liquor
a. beer
b. wine
c. malternatives
d. liquor
5. Beverages
a. general
b. new age/sports/water
6. Computers
a. software
b. hardware
7. Consumer Electronics
8. Cosmetics and Fragrances
a. color cosmetics
b. eye color
c. lip color
d. women’s fragrances
e. men’s fragrances
9. Credit Cards
10. Entertainment
11. Fast Food
12. Financial Services
13. Food
a. ready to eat cereal
b. cereal bars
c. cookies
d. cheese
e. crackers
f. salted snacks
g. frozen dinners and entrées

14.
15.

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

h. frozen pizza
i. spaghetti sauce
j. coffee
k. ice cream
l. refrigerated orange juice
m. refrigerated yogurt
n. soy drinks
o. luncheon meats
p. meat alternatives
q. baby formula/electrolyte solutions
r. pourable salad dressing
Footwear
Health and Beauty
a. bar soap
b. toothpaste
c. shampoo
d. hair color
Household
a. cleaner
b. laundry detergents
c. diapers
d. facial tissue
e. toilet tissue
f. automatic dishwater detergent
Petrol
a. oil companies
b. automotive aftercare/lube
Pharmaceutical OTC
a. allergy/cold medicine
b. stomach/antacids
c. analgesics
Pharmaceutical Prescription
Retail
Telecommunications
Tobacco
Toys
Travel
World Wide Web

Table 1: Categories and subcategories. Items in italics have been removed.
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ulation their responses are propensity weighted. Each respondent rates around 80
of these brands. Perceived quality is measured on a 0-10 scale, with 0 meaning unacceptable/poor and 10 meaning outstanding/extraordinary. Awareness scores vary
between 0 and 100 and equal the percentage of respondents that can rate the brand’s
quality. The quality rating is therefore conditional on the respondent being aware of
the brand.6
We supplement the awareness and quality measures with advertising expenditures
that are taken from TNS Media Intelligence and Competitive Media Reporting. These
advertising expenditures encompass spending in a wide range of media: Magazines
(consumer magazines, Sunday magazines, local magazines, and business-to-business
magazines), newspaper (local and national newspapers), television (network TV, spot
TV, syndicated TV, and network cable TV), radio (network, national spot, and local),
Spanish-language media (magazines, newspapers, and TV networks), internet, and
outdoor.
After eliminating categories and subcategories where observations are not at the
brand level (apparel, entertainment, financial services, retail, world wide web) or
where the data are suspect (tobacco), we are left with 19 categories (see again Table
1). We then drop all private labels and all brands for which we do not have perceived
quality and awareness scores as well as advertising expenditures for at least two years
running. This leaves us with 348 brands.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the overall sample and also by category.
In the overall sample the average awareness score is 69.35 and the average perceived
quality score is 6.36. The average amount spent on advertising is around $66 million
per year. There is substantial variation in these measures across categories. The
variation in perceived quality (coefficient of variation is 0.11 overall, ranging from 0.04
for appliances to 0.13 for computers) tends to be lower than the variation in brand
awareness (coefficient of variation is 0.28 overall, ranging from 0.05 for appliances to
0.46 for telecommunications), in line with the fact the quality rating is conditional on
the respondent being aware of the brand. The contemporaneous correlation between
You may use any number from 0 to 10 to rate the brands, or use 99 for ‘No Opinion’ option if you
have absolutely no opinion about the brand.” Panelists are being incentivized through sweepstakes
on a periodic basis but are not paid for a particular survey.
6
The 2000 Superbrands survey does not separately report perceived quality and salience scores.
We received these scores directly from Harris Interactive. 2000 is the first year for which we have been
able to obtain perceived quality and salience scores for a large number of brands. Starting with the
2004 and 2005 Superbrands surveys, salience is replaced by a new measure called “familiarity.” For
these two years we received salience scores directly from Harris Interactive. The contemporaneous
correlation between salience and familiarity is 0.98 and significant with a p-value of 0.000.
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brand awareness and perceived quality is 0.60 and significant with a p-value of 0.000.
The contemporaneous correlation between advertising expenditures and the change
in brand awareness is 0.0488 and significant with a p-value of 0.0985 and the contemporaneous correlation between advertising expenditures and the change in perceived
quality is 0.0718 and significant with a p-value of 0.0150. These correlations anticipate the spurious correlation between both brand awareness and perceived quality
and advertising expenditures if permanent differences between brands are neglected
(POLS estimator). We will see though that the effect of advertising expenditures on
perceived quality disappears once unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (FE and
GMM estimators).
The intertemporal correlation is 0.98 for brand awareness, 0.95 for perceived quality, and 0.93 for advertising expenditures. This limited amount of intertemporal
variation warrants preferring the SGMM over the DGMM estimator. At the same
time, however, it constrains how finely we can “slice” the data, e.g., by isolating a
brand-specific effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness and perceived
quality.
Since the FE, DGMM, and SGMM estimators rely on within-brand across-time
variation, it is important to ensure that there is a sufficient amount of within-brand
variation in brand awareness, perceived quality, and advertising expenditures. Table
3 presents a decomposition of the standard deviation in these variables into an acrossbrands and a within-brand component for the overall sample and also by category.
The across-brands standard deviation is a measure of the cross-sectional variation and
the within-brand standard deviation is a measure of the time-series variation. The
across-brands standard deviation of brand awareness is about 6 times larger than the
within-brand standard deviation. This ratio varies across categories and ranges from
2 for automobiles, beer, wine, liquor, and pharmaceutical prescription to 6 for health
and beauty and pharmaceutical OTC. In case of perceived quality the ratio is about
4 (ranging from 1 for telecommunications to 5 for consumer electronics, credit cards,
and household). Hence, while there is more cross-sectional than time-series variation
in our sample, the time-series variation is substantial for both brand awareness and
perceived quality. Figure 1 illustrates the decomposition for the overall sample. The
left panels show histograms of the brand-mean of brand awareness, perceived quality,
and advertising expenditures and the right panels show histograms of the de-meaned
variables. Again it is evident that the time-series variation is substantial for both
brand awareness and perceived quality.
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overall
Appliances
Automobiles
Beer, Wine, Liquor
Beverages
Computers
Consumer Electronics
Cosmetics and Fragrances
Credit Cards
Fast Food
Food
Footwear
Health and Beauty
Household
Petrol
Pharmaceutical OTC
Pharmaceutical Prescription
Telecommunications
Toys
Travel
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.

# obs # brands
1478
348
21
4
137
30
98
24
95
22
79
17
29
7
70
19
29
6
60
12
247
65
38
8
54
11
128
31
48
13
56
15
31
10
52
11
25
5
181
38

brand
perceived
awareness (0-100)
quality (0-10)
mean
std. dev. mean std. dev.
69.35
19.43
6.36
0.70
85.09
4.54
7.35
0.32
67.81
6.72
6.51
0.59
62.23
10.13
5.68
0.72
84.57
13.84
6.51
0.58
59.80
23.05
6.41
0.81
67.83
18.68
6.60
0.73
49.37
15.75
5.83
0.52
70.97
18.08
6.24
0.73
93.83
5.32
6.28
0.42
80.18
14.94
6.66
0.65
64.95
18.98
6.39
0.42
82.50
9.80
6.67
0.41
73.83
16.03
6.66
0.56
60.52
17.19
5.95
0.30
76.96
13.89
6.79
0.37
29.97
9.69
5.54
0.67
49.33
22.86
5.28
0.52
72.12
9.74
6.95
0.32
59.48
15.43
6.26
0.52

advertising
($1,000,000)
mean std. dev.
66.21
118.52
41.87
33.19
99.85
64.62
36.78
45.11
41.33
42.19
130.43
130.07
104.83
160.66
38.02
47.48
174.54
109.77
214.80
156.23
13.93
13.81
40.27
46.89
27.28
33.44
21.80
25.43
33.54
34.65
38.71
18.13
76.23
36.40
367.93
360.54
108.55
54.36
25.41
25.88
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perceived
quality (0-10)
across within
0.726 0.176
0.323 0.148
0.561 0.141
0.705 0.186
0.582 0.190
0.850 0.313
0.800 0.167
0.563 0.208
0.788 0.159
0.361 0.202
0.702 0.134
0.388 0.167
0.397 0.136
0.561 0.113
0.415 0.116
0.336 0.129
0.753 0.230
0.452 0.334
0.360 0.127
0.516 0.153

Table 3: Variance decomposition.

brand
awareness (0-100)
across
within
overall
20.117
3.415
Appliances
5.282
1.334
Automobiles
6.209
3.281
Beer, Wine, Liquor
10.181
4.105
Beverages
13.435
2.915
Computers
23.094
3.843
Consumer Electronics
19.952
5.611
Cosmetics and Fragrances
18.054
3.684
Credit Cards
19.568
3.903
Fast Food
6.132
1.660
Food
16.241
2.255
Footwear
20.417
4.267
Health and Beauty
10.536
1.772
Household
16.719
3.896
Petrol
20.179
3.669
Pharmaceutical OTC
13.339
2.363
Pharmaceutical Prescription 9.393
5.772
Telecommunications
21.659
5.604
Toys
11.217
3.589
Travel
16.063
3.216

advertising
($1,000,000)
across within
100.823 43.625
28.965 21.316
54.680 32.552
41.713 12.406
37.505 13.372
110.362 65.909
105.249 114.381
38.446 20.053
118.059 43.415
159.306 33.527
15.655
7.998
45.791
7.640
27.054 19.075
18.789 16.672
27.227 20.496
16.325
9.080
38.648 27.919
317.434 178.406
61.419 18.584
22.136 10.909
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Figure 1: Variance decomposition. Histogram of brand-mean of brand awareness, perceived quality, and advertising expenditures (left panels) and histogram of de-meaned
brand awareness, perceived quality, and advertising expenditures (right panels).

5

Empirical Results

In Tables 4 and 5 we present a number of different estimates for the effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness and perceived quality, respectively. Starting
with the simplest case absent competition, we present estimates of γ, β1 , and β2 (the
2
) along with the marginal effect
coefficients on Qit−1 or Ait−1 and Eit−1 and Eit−1
β1 + 2β2 Eit−1 calculated at the mean and the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of
advertising expenditures.
The POLS estimates in the first column of Tables 4 and 5 suggest a significant
positive effect of advertising expenditures on both brand awareness and perceived
quality. In both cases we also reject the null hypothesis that advertising plays no
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***

***

***

***

0.969
1148
317

reject ***

0.00481
(0.00107)
0.00527
(0.00116)
0.00514
(0.00113)
0.00470
(0.00105)

0.494
0.940
0.851
1148
317

do not reject

0.00668
(0.00412)
0.00684
(0.00438)
0.00679
(0.00430)
0.00664
(0.00405)

FE
0.223 ***
(0.0479)
0.00687
(0.00443)
-0.00000139
(0.00000332)

1148
317

**

reject
do not reject

819
274

do not reject
do not reject
reject **
do not reject

***

reject

**

**

**

**

reject *

0.00558
(0.00269)
0.00617
(0.00296)
0.00600
(0.00288)
0.00544
(0.00263)

SGMM
0.837 ***
(0.0266)
0.00627 **
(0.00300)
-0.00000524 **
(0.00000239)

do not reject

0.0138
(0.0129)
0.0150
(0.0138)
0.0147
(0.0135)
0.0136
(0.00127)

DGMM
0.679 ***
(0.109)
0.0152
(0.0139)
-0.0000105
(0.00000745)

Table 4: Brand awareness. *, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively. Standard errors in
parenthesis.

advertising test:
β1 = β2 = 0
specification tests:
Hansen J
difference-in-Hansen J
Arellano & Bond AR(2)
Arellano & Bond AR(3)
goodness of fit measures:
R2 -within
R2 -between
R2
# obs
# brands

75th pctl.

50th pctl.

25th pctl.

marginal effect of advertising at:
mean

advertising2

advertising

lagged brand awareness

POLS
0.942 ***
(0.00602)
0.00535 ***
(0.00117)
-0.00000409 ***
(0.000000979)
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0.914
1148
317

reject

0.0002
(0.0000819)
0.000215
(0.0000933)
0.000211
(0.00009)
0.0001965
(0.0000793)

0.000218
(0.0000952)
-0.000000133
(0.000000107)

**

**

**

**

**

**

***

0.180
0.952
0.909
1148
317

do not reject

0.0000877
(0.000180)
0.000083
(0.000195)
0.0000844
(0.000191)
0.0000887
(0.000177)

0.0000822
(0.000198)
0.0000000408
(0.000000162)

FE
0.391
(0.0611)
***

819
274

reject
do not reject

1148
317

reject
reject
reject
do not reject

do not reject

0.0000295
(0.000176)
0.0000230
(0.000201)
0.0000249
(0.000194)
0.0000310
(0.000170)

0.0000219
(0.000205)
0.0000000571
(0.000000231)

do not reject

***

***

SGMM
1.047
(0.0459)

do not reject

-5.13e-06
(0.000848)
-0.0000174
(0.000952)
-0.0000139
(0.000922)
-2.32e-06
(0.000825)

-0.0000195
(0.000969)
0.000000108
(0.000000945)

DGMM
0.659
(0.204)

**
**
***

***

604
178

do not reject
do not reject
reject
do not reject

do not reject

0.0000594
(0.000740)
0.0000642
(0.000917)
0.0000623
(0.000847)
0.0000588
(0.000714)

0.0000649
(0.000944)
0.0000000807
(0.00000308)

***

objective
quality
0.981 ***
(0.0431)

1148
317

reject
do not reject
reject
do not reject

do not reject

-0.000256
(0.000222)
-0.000292
(0.000251)
-0.000282
(0.000242)
-0.000248
(0.000215)

***

**

brand
awareness
0.937 ***
(0.0413)
0.00596 ***
(0.00165)
-0.000298
(0.000256)
0.000000319
(0.000000267)

Table 5: Perceived quality. *, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively. Standard errors in
parenthesis. SGMM estimates in columns labeled “objective quality” and “brand awareness”.

advertising test:
β1 = β2 = 0
specification tests:
Hansen J
difference-in-Hansen J
Arellano & Bond AR(2)
Arellano & Bond AR(3)
goodness of fit measures:
R2 -within
R2 -between
R2
# obs
# brands

75th pctl.

50th pctl.

25th pctl.

marginal effect of
advertising at:
mean

advertising2

advertising

brand awareness

lagged perceived quality

POLS
0.970
(0.0110)

role in determining brand awareness and perceived quality (β1 = β2 = 0). Of course,
as mentioned above, POLS accounts for neither unobserved heterogeneity nor endogeneity. In the next columns of Tables 4 and 5 we present FE, DGMM, and SGMM
estimates that attend to these issues.7
Regardless of the class of estimator we find a significant positive effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness. With the FE estimator we find that the
marginal effect of advertising on awareness at the mean is 0.00668. It is borderline
significant with a p-value of 0.105 and implies an elasticity of 0.00638 (with a standard error of 0.00392). A one-standard-deviation increase of advertising expenditures
increase brand awareness by 0.0408 standard deviations (with a standard error of
0.0251). The rate of depreciation of a brand’s stock of awareness is estimated to be
1-0.223 or 78% per year. The FE estimator identifies the effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness solely from the within-brand across-time variation. The
problem with this estimator is that it does not deal with the endogeneity of the lagged
dependent variable on the right-hand side of equation (2) and the potential endogeneity of advertising expenditures. We thus turn to the GMM estimators described in
Section 3.
We focus on the more efficient SGMM estimator. The coefficient on the linear term in advertising expenditures is estimated to be 0.00627 (p-value 0.037) and
the coefficient on the quadratic term is estimated to be −0.00000524 (p-value 0.028).
These estimates support the hypothesis that the relationship between advertising and
awareness is nonlinear. The marginal effect of advertising on awareness is estimated
to be 0.00558 (p-value 0.038) at the mean and implies an elasticity of 0.00533 (with
a standard error of 0.00257). A one-standard-deviation increase of advertising expenditures increase brand awareness by 0.0340 standard deviations (with a standard
error of 0.0164). The rate of depreciation decreases substantially after correcting for
endogeneity and is estimated to be 1-0.828 or 17% per year, thus indicating that an
increase in a brand’s stock of awareness due to an increase in advertising expenditures
persists for years to come.
The Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions indicates that the instruments
taken together as a group are valid. Recall from Section 3 that we must assume
7

The estimates use at most 317 out of 348 brands because we restrict the sample to brands with
data for two years running but use third and higher lags of brand awareness respectively perceived
quality and advertising expenditures as instruments. Different sample sizes are reported for the
DGMM and SGMM estimators. Sample size is not a well-defined concept in SGMM since this
estimator essentially runs on two different samples simultaneously. The xtabond2 routine in STATA
reports the size of the transformed sample for DGMM and of the untransformed sample for SGMM.
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that an extra condition holds in order for the SGMM estimator to be appropriate.
The difference-in-Hansen J test confirms that it does, as we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the additional instruments for the level equations are valid. While
we reject the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the error terms, we
cannot reject the hypothesis of no third-order serial correlation. This result further
validates our instrumenting strategy. However, one may still be worried about the
SGMM estimates because DGMM uses a strict subset of the orthogonality conditions
of SGMM and we reject the Hansen J test for the DGMM estimates (see Table 4).
From a formal statistical point of view, rejecting the smaller set of orthogonality
conditions in DGMM is not conclusive evidence that the larger set of orthogonality
conditions in SGMM are invalid (Hayashi 2000, pp. 218–221).
In Figure 2 we plot the marginal effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness over the entire range of advertising expenditures for our SGMM estimates along
with a histogram of advertising expenditures. For advertising expenditures between
$400 million and $800 million per year the marginal effect of advertising on awareness
is no longer significantly different from zero and, statistically, it is actually negative
for very high advertising expenditures over $800 million per year. The former case
covers around 1.9% of observations and the latter less than 0.5%. One possible interpretation is that brands with very high current advertising expenditures are those
that are already well-known (perhaps because they have been heavily advertised over
the years), so that advertising cannot further boost their awareness. Indeed, average
awareness for observations with over $400 million in advertising expenditures is 74.94
as compared to 69.35 for the entire sample.
Turning from brand awareness in Table 4 to perceived quality in Table 5, we see
that the positive effect of advertising expenditures on perceived quality found by
the POLS estimator disappears once unobserved heterogeneity is accounted by the
FE, DGMM, and SGMM estimators. In fact, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that advertising plays no role in determining perceived quality. Figure 3 graphically
illustrates the absence of an effect of advertising expenditures on perceived quality
at the margin for our DGMM estimates. While the effect of advertising expenditures
on perceived quality is very imprecisely estimated, it appears to be economically
insignificant: The implied elasticity is −0.0000534 (with a standard error of 0.00883)
and a one-standard-deviation increase of advertising expenditures decrease perceived
quality by 0.000869 standard deviations (with a standard error of 0.144). Note that
the comparable effects for brand awareness are two orders of magnitude larger. Much
of the remainder of this paper is concerned with demonstrating the robustness of this
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Figure 2: Pointwise confidence interval for the marginal effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness (upper panel) and histogram of advertising expenditures
(lower panel). SGMM estimates.
negative result.
Before proceeding we note that whenever possible we focus on the more efficient
SGMM estimator. Unfortunately, for perceived quality in many cases, including that
in the fourth column of Table 5, the difference-in-Hansen J test rejects the null
hypothesis that the extra moments in the SGMM estimator are valid. In these cases
we focus on the DGMM estimator.

5.1

Objective and Perceived Quality

An important component of a brand’s perceived quality is its objective quality. To the
extent that objective quality remains constant, it is absorbed into the brand effects.
But, even though the time frame of our sample is not very long, it is certainly possible
that the objective quality of some brands has changed over the course of our sample.
If so, then the lack of an effect of advertising expenditures on perceived quality may
be explained if brand managers increase advertising expenditures to compensate for
decreases in objective quality. To the extent that increased advertising expenditures
22
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Figure 3: Pointwise confidence interval for the marginal effect of advertising expenditures on perceived quality (upper panel) and histogram of advertising expenditures
(lower panel). DGMM estimates.
and decreased objective quality cancel each other out, their net effect on perceived
quality may be zero.
The difficulty with testing this alternative explanation is that we do not have
data on objective quality. We therefore exclude from the analysis those categories
with brands that are likely to undergo changes in objective quality (appliances, automobiles, computers, consumer electronics, fast food, footwear, pharmaceutical OTC,
telecommunications, toys, and travel). The resulting estimates are reported in Table 5 under the heading “objective quality.” We still find no effect of advertising
expenditures on perceived quality.8

5.2

Variation in Perceived Quality

Another possible reason for the lack of an effect of advertising expenditures on perceived quality is that perceived quality may not vary much over time. This is not
8

The marginal effects are calculated at the mean, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile for advertising
for the brands in the categories judged to be stable in terms of objective quality over time.
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the case in our data. Indeed, the standard deviation of the year-to-year changes in
perceived quality is 0.2154.
Even for those products whose objective quality does not change over time there
are important changes in perceived quality (standard deviation 0.2130). For example, consider bottled water where we expect little change in objective quality over
time, both within and across brands. Nonetheless, there is considerable variation in
perceived quality. The perceived quality of Aquafina Water range across years from
6.33 to 6.90 and that of Poland Spring Water from 5.91 to 6.43, so the equivalent of
over two standard deviations. Across the brands of bottled water the range is from
5.88 to 6.90, or the equivalent of over four standard deviations.
Further evidence of variation in perceived quality is provided by the automobiles
category. Here we have obtained measures of objective quality from Consumer Reports that rate vehicles based on their performance, comfort, convenience, safety,
and fuel economy. We can find examples of brands whose objective quality does not
change at least for a number of years while their perceived quality fluctuates considerably. For example, Chevy Silverado’s objective quality does not change between
2000 and 2002, but its perceived quality increases from 6.08 to 6.71 over these three
years. Similarly, GMC Sierra’s objective quality does not change between 2001 and
2003, but its perceived quality decreases from 6.72 to 6.26.
The final piece of evidence that we have to offer is the variance decomposition from
Section 4 (see again Table 3 and Figure 1). Recall that the across-brands standard
deviation of brand awareness is about 6 times larger than the within-brand standard
deviation. In case of perceived quality the ratio is about 4. Hence, while there is more
cross-sectional than time-series variation in our sample, the time-series variation is
substantial for both brand awareness and perceived quality. Also recall from Section
4 that perceived quality with an intertemporal correlation of 0.95 is somewhat less
persistent than brand awareness with an intertemporal correlation of 0.98. Given
that we are able to detect an effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness,
it seems unlikely that insufficient variation within brands can explain the lack of an
effect of advertising expenditures on perceived quality; instead, our results suggest
that the variation in perceived quality is unrelated to advertising expenditures.
The question then becomes what besides advertising may drive these changes
in perceived quality. There are numerous possibilities, including consumer learning
and word-of-mouth effects. Unfortunately, given the data available to us, we cannot
further explore these possibilities.
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5.3

Brand Awareness and Perceived Quality

Another concern is that consumers may confound awareness and preference. That
is, consumers may simply prefer more familiar brands over less familiar ones (see
Zajonc 1968). To address this issue we proxy for consumers’ familiarity by adding
brand awareness to the regression for perceived quality. The resulting estimates are
reported in Table 5 under the heading “brand awareness.” While there is a significant
positive relationship between brand awareness and perceived quality, there is still
no evidence of a significant positive effect of advertising expenditures on perceived
quality.

5.4

Competitive Effects

Advertising takes place in a competitive environment. Most of the industries being
studied here are indeed oligopolies, which suggests that strategic considerations may
influence advertising decisions. We next allow a brand’s stocks of awareness and
perceived quality to be affected by the advertising of its competitors as discussed
in Section 2.9 Competitors’ advertising, in turn, can enter our estimation equations
(1) and (2) either relative in the share-of-voice specification or absolute in the totaladvertising specification. We report the resulting estimates in Table 6.
Somewhat surprisingly, the share-of-voice specification yields an insignificant effect of own advertising. We conclude that the share-of-voice specification is simply
not an appropriate functional form in our application. The total-advertising specification readily confirms our main findings presented above that own advertising affects
brand awareness but not perceived quality. This is true even if we allow competitors’
advertising to enter quadratically in addition to linearly. Competitors’ advertising
has a significant negative effect on brand awareness and a significant positive effect
on perceived quality.
Repeating the analysis using the sum instead of the average of competitors’ advertising yields largely similar results except that the share-of-voice specification yields a
significant negative effect of advertising on brand awareness, thereby reinforcing our
conclusion that this is not an appropriate functional form.10
9

For this analysis we take the subcategory rather than the category as the relevant competitive
environment. Consider for instance the beer, wine, liquor category. There is no reason to expect the
advertising expenditures of beer brands to affect the perceived quality or awareness of liquor brands.
We drop any subcategory in any year where there is just one brand due to the lack of competitors.
10
We caution the reader against reading too much into these results: The number and identity
of the brands within a subcategory or category varies sometimes widely from year to year in the
Brandweek Superbrands surveys. Thus, the sum of competitors’ advertising is an extremely volatile
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reject
do not reject
reject
do not reject
1147
317

do not reject
do not reject
reject
do not reject
1147
317
**

do not reject

0.000225
(0.000218)
0.00113
(0.00110)
0.00429
(0.000416)
0.000179
(0.000173)

do not reject

0.00333
( 0.00239)
0.0164
(0.01218)
0.00624
(0.00448)
0.00264
(0.00190)

***

*

do not reject
do not reject
reject
do not reject
1147
317

reject

0.00812
(0.00355)
0.00881
(0.00382)
0.00861
(0.00375)
0.00797
(0.00349)

0.00892
(0.00387)
-0.00000602
(0.00000248)
-0.00609
(0.00363)

**

**

**

**

**

**

*

**

**

reject
do not reject
1147
317

do not reject

do not reject

-0.000140
(0.000524)
-0.0000174
(0.000582)
-0.0000164
(0.000565)
-0.0000132
(0.000510)

-0.0000180
(0.000592)
-0.0000000303
(0.000000535)
0.00128
(0.000515)

***

**

total advertising
brand awareness
perceived quality
0.845 ***
0.356 **
(0.0217)
(0.145)

Table 6: Competitive effects. *, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively. Standard errors in
parenthesis. DGMM estimates in column labeled “total advertising/perceived quality” and SGMM estimates otherwise.

advertising test:
β1 = β2 = 0
specification tests:
Hansen J
difference-in-Hansen J
Arellano & Bond AR(2)
Arellano & Bond AR(3)
# obs
# brands

75th pctl.

50th pctl.

25th pctl.

marginal effect of advertising at:
mean

competitors’ advertising

advertising2

advertising

(relative advertising)2

relative advertising

lagged awareness/quality

share of voice
brand awareness
perceived quality
0.872 ***
1.068 ***
(0.0348)
(0.0406)
0.236
0.0168
(0.170)
(0.0164)
-0.00912
-0.00102
(0.0104)
(0.00132)

Overall, the inclusion of competitors’ advertising does not seem to influence our
results about the role of own advertising on brand awareness and perceived quality.
This justifies our focus on the simple model without competition. Moreover, it suggests that the following alternative explanation for our main findings presented above
is unlikely.Suppose awareness depended positively on the total amount of advertising
in the brand’s subcategory or category while perceived quality depended positively
on the brand’s own advertising but negatively on competitors’ advertising. Then the
results from the simple model without competition could be driven by an omitted
variables problem: If the brand’s own advertising is highly correlated with competitors’ advertising, then we would overstate the impact of advertising on awareness
and understate the impact on perceived quality. In fact, we might find no impact of
advertising on perceived quality at all if the brand’s own advertising and competitors’
advertising cancel each other out.

5.5

Category-Specific Effects

Perhaps the ideal data for analyzing the effect of advertising are time series of advertising expenditures, brand awareness, and perceived quality for the brands being
studied. With long enough time series we could then try to identify for each brand
in isolation the effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness and perceived
quality. Since such time series are unfortunately not available, we have focused so far
on the aggregate effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness and perceived
quality, i.e., we have constrained the slope parameters in equations (1) and (2) that
determine the effect of advertising to be the same across brands. Similarly, we have
constrained the carryover parameters in equations (1) and (2) that determine the
effect of lagged perceived quality and brand awareness respectively to be the same
across brands.
As a compromise between the two extremes of brands in isolation versus all brands
aggregated, we first examine the effect of advertising in different categories. This adds
some cross-sectional variation across the brands within a category. As the first column
of Table 7 shows, for the majority of categories, there is nevertheless insufficient
variation to identify an effect of advertising even on awareness: There is a significant
positive effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness for five categories.
At the same time, there is a significant positive effect on perceived quality for five
measure of the competitive environment. Moreover, the number of brands varies from 3 for some
subcategories to 10 for others, thus making the sum of competitors’ advertising difficult to compare
across subcategories.
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categories (third column).
Two caveats are in order. First, we may be capturing the relationship between
advertising expenditures and perceived quality across brands: Because the SGMM
estimator adds the equations in levels, it relies on more of the cross-sectional variation for identification. Indeed, the FE estimator that relies solely on variation over
time within brands detects a significant positive effect of advertising expenditures on
perceived quality for just two categories. Second, we are pushing the limit on the
number of instruments. Indeed, we are unable to obtain estimates unless we collapse
the set of instruments, creating one instrument for each variable and lag, rather than
one for each period, variable, and lag.
Second we examine the carryover rate in different categories. As the second column
of Table 7 shows, the rate of depreciation for brand awareness ranges from 1-0.875
or 12% for health and beauty to 1-0.751 or 25% for pharmaceutical prescription. For
perceived quality the rate of depreciation similarly ranges from 1-0.880 or 12% for
appliances to 1-0.766 or 23% for telecommunications (fourth column). Surprisingly,
the SGMM estimates indicate that, once we allow for the carryover rate to vary
by category, advertising expenditures have a positive significant effect on perceived
quality (0.00106 at the mean), although this is not the case for the FE estimates.
In sum, it appears that there are important differences between categories. These
differences, in turn, may help to explain why some brands advertise heavily despite
already enjoying a high level of brand awareness. A case in point is the fast food
category. On average, this category exhibits the highest level of brand awareness and
the second-highest level of advertising expenditures after telecommunications (see
again Table 2). A brand has an incentive to put substantial resources into advertising
if it either has a particularly high response to advertising or a particularly high rate of
depreciation. For brands in the fast food category the rate of depreciation is 1-0.859
or 14% for brand awareness (compared to 1-0.837 or 16% in the overall sample) and
1-0.849 or 15% for perceived quality. At the same time, however, the marginal effect
of advertising expenditures is 0.0144 for brand awareness (compared to 0.00558 in the
overall sample) and 0.000727 for perceived quality. Hence, the response to advertising
is particularly high for both brand awareness and perceived quality.

5.6

Functional Form

Throughout we consider a quadratic functional form for the effect of the level of
advertising expenditures on the level of brand awareness and perceived quality. In
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Appliances
Automobiles
Beer, Wine, Liquor
Beverages
Computers
Consumer Electronics
Cosmetics and Fragrances
Credit Cards
Fast Food
Food
Footwear
Health and Beauty
Household
Petrol
Pharmaceutical OTC
Pharmaceutical Prescription
Telecommunications
Toys
Travel

brand awareness
marginal effect carryover
0.0233
0.838
(0.0167)
(0.0730)
0.00526
0.840
(0.0154)
(0.0402)
-0.0264
0.839
(0.0423)
(0.0408)
-0.0245
0.869
(0.0554)
(0.0265)
0.0193 **
0.799
(0.00777)
(0.0370)
0.0210 **
0.810
(0.00931)
(0.0361)
-0.104 *
0.766
(0.557)
(0.0521)
0.00983 *
0.834
(0.00527)
(0.0371)
0.0144 ***
0.859
(0.00543)
(0.0262)
0.0296
0.869
(0.0371)
(0.0301)
-0.0120
0.830
(0.0248)
(0.0622)
0.0841 ***
0.875
(0.0319)
(0.0278)
0.0743
0.862
(0.0670)
(0.0317)
-0.0600
0.847
(0.0676)
(0.0357)
0.0147
0.840
(0.206)
(0.0604)
-0.00683
0.751
(0.0355)
(0.0747)
0.0105
0.800
(0.0117)
(0.0361)
0.0574
0.815
(0.0673)
(0.0761)
-0.0982
0.832
(0.104)
(0.0415)

rate
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

perceived
marginal effect
0.00374
(0.00315)
0.000172
(0.000864)
-0.000988
(0.00535)
-0.000564
(0.00567)
0.000722
(0.000470)
0.00189 ***
(0.000518)
0.000874
(0.00141)
0.000231
(0.000222)
0.000727 ***
(0.000207)
0.00287
(0.00390)
0.00390 ***
(0.00139)
0.00665 ***
(0.00188)
0.00914 ***
(0.00296)
0.00433
(0.00266)
0.00329
(0.00253)
-0.00488 **
(0.00199)
0.000203
(0.000497)
0.0000834
(0.00116)
0.00603
(0.00518)

quality
carryover
0.880
(0.0413)
0.854
(0.0476)
0.811
(0.0553)
0.877
(0.0463)
0.826
(0.0488)
0.849
(0.0445)
0.862
(0.0545)
0.853
(0.0514)
0.849
(0.0530)
0.873
(0.0432)
0.878
(0.0498)
0.879
(0.0441)
0.876
(0.0434)
0.852
(0.0505)
0.866
(0.0437)
0.800
(0.0521)
0.766
(0.0728)
0.862
(0.0715)
0.861
(0.0465)

Table 7: Category-specific effects. Marginal effect of advertising expenditures on
brand awareness and perceived quality at mean by category. Carryover rate by category. *, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively.
Standard errors in parenthesis. SGMM estimates.
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rate
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

30
reject
do not reject
795
267

do not reject

reject
reject
reject
do not reject
1123
312

***
**
**

do not reject

-0.00435
(0.00211)
-0.0166
(0.00800)
-0.00869
(0.00414)
-0.00379
(0.00184)

-0.00557
(0.0596)
-0.0337
(0.0190)

***

**

**

**

**

*

perceived quality
0.680 ***
(0.226)

do not reject

-0.00197
(0.00612)
-0.0131
(0.0424)
-0.00494
(0.0134)
-0.00165
(0.00539)

-0.119
(0.775)
-0.00137
(0.108)

brand awareness
0.886 ***
(0.0459)

reject
do not reject
do not reject
do not reject
1148
317

reject

0.000120
(0.0000473)
0.000133
(0.0000518)
0.000130
(0.0000505)
0.000117
(0.0000463)

0.000136
(0.0000526)
-0.000000115
(4.14e-08)

0.825
(0.0281)

**

**

**

**

**

**

***

**

***

ln(brand awareness)

reject
do not reject
819
274

do not reject

do not reject

-0.0000102
(0.000127)
-0.0000137
(0.000143)
-0.0000127
(0.0000138)
-0.00000937
(0.0000123)

-0.0000143
(0.000146)
3.13e-08
(0.000000152)

0.666
(0.201)

***

***

ln(perceived quality)

Table 8: Functional form. *, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively. Standard errors in
parenthesis. SGMM estimates in columns labeled “brand awareness” and “ln(brand awareness)” and DGMM estimates in
columns labeled “perceived quality” and “ln(perceived quality).”

advertising test:
β1 = β2 = 0
specification tests:
Hansen J
difference-in-Hansen J
Arellano & Bond AR(2)
Arellano & Bond AR(3)
# obs
# brands

75th pctl.

50th pctl.

25th pctl.

marginal effect of advertising at:
mean

advertising2

advertising

ln(advertising)2

ln(advertising)

lagged ln(awareness)/ln(quality)

lagged awareness/quality

Table 8 we report results for the estimation of equations (1) and (2) using different
functional forms.
We first consider the case of f (Eit−1 ) = β1 ln Eit−1 + β2 (ln Eit−1 )2 .11 There is no
effect of advertising expenditures on brand awareness and we find a negative effect of
advertising on perceived quality. This may indicate that this functional form is not
appropriate in our application.
Next we allow for a quadratic relationship between the level of advertising expenditures on the one hand and the log of brand awareness and perceived quality on the
other hand. As Table 8 shows, we still find no effect of advertising expenditures on
the log of perceived quality. In contrast, we find a positive effect of advertising on
the log of brand awareness.

6

Discussion

To our knowledge this is the first study to make use of panel data on a wide range
of brands along with recently developed methods for estimating dynamic models
to study the effect of advertising on brand awareness and perceived quality. Our
panel data allow us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across brands and to
identify the effect of advertising off time-series variation within brands. They also let
us account for the endogeneity of advertising.
Our main findings are that advertising expenditures have a significant positive effect on a brand’s stock of awareness but no significant effect on its stock of perceived
quality. These findings are consistent with previous empirical work and laboratory
experiments. The results in Ackerberg (2001), for example, indicate that the primary
effect of advertising for the particular brand of yogurt being studied is that of informing consumers. However, the importance of information may vary with the stages of
a product’s life cycle. Narayanan & Manchanda (2008) find that the responsiveness
of physicians to the informative content of detailing and the responsiveness to the
persuasive content are negatively correlated over time. Mitra & Lynch (1995) show
that, especially in mature product categories, advertising has a much stronger effect
on the size of the consideration set than on the relative strength of preferences.
Our research complements and generalizes existing studies by Shachar & Anand
(1998), Ackerberg (2001), Narayanan, Manchanda & Chintagunta (2005), and Narayanan
11

The number of observations differs slightly across specifications because the logarithm of zero is
not defined. Our conclusions remain unchanged if we replace ln Ejt−1 by ln(c + Ejt−1 ), where c > 0
is a constant, in order to be able to use all observations.
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& Manchanda (2008) that apply econometric models to discern the role of advertising for a single brand or industry. The key idea used in these studies to distinguish
between informative and persuasive advertising is that informed consumers should
not be affected (or as affected) by informative advertising as uninformed consumers
whereas the effect of persuasive advertising should be independent of the amount
of information that is available to consumers. The difficulty lies in identifying the
amount of information that is available to consumers. The common approach is to
proxy for available information with usage experience: once consumers have used
the brand, they must be aware of its existence and should know its characteristics,
so informative advertising should not affect them any more. Since usage experience
is often not directly observable, this empirical strategy is largely limited to newly
introduced brands.12
The current paper contributes to our understanding of the nature of advertising
in two ways. By using data on over 300 brands across 19 product categories, we are
able to say something more general about the effect of advertising than just for a
single brand or industry. In addition, our direct measures of the level of information
possessed by consumers and of their quality perceptions allow us to study the channel
through which advertising affects consumer choice without making assumptions about
the amount of information that is available to consumers on the basis of their purchase
behavior.
While our main findings highlight advertising as a means of providing information
to consumers, there are important differences between categories. In some categories
at least advertising may also be a means of altering quality perceptions. This conclusion suggest that a long enough time series on advertising expenditures, perceived
quality, and brand awareness may prove ideal to identify and quantify the various
effects of advertising for a specific category (or even for specific brand) in isolation.
At the same time, however, our results hint at the role of the competitive environment
that cannot be adequately captured without a broad enough cross section.
It is furthermore important to note that our analysis focuses on the short-run relationship between advertising expenditures, brand awareness, and perceived quality.
That is, we can only say that advertising has no short-run influence on perceived
quality. Again this is dictated by the data. It is of course still possible that advertising affects perceived quality, but only after a period of time. On the other hand,
12

Anand & Shachar (2004) pursue a different methodology that is not limited to newly introduced
brands, although the data requirement may prevent more wide-spread application. Their study of
advertising for television shows in the form of previews highlights advertising as a vehicle of matching
and information rather than an instrument of persuasion.
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given that we have six years worth of data, the short run in our model is fairly long.
It is unclear whether, in practice, the time horizon of firms is much longer than that.
Therefore, even if advertising had an effect in the long run, brand managers may not
be willing to expend resources today in order to reap benefits that are that far in the
future.
Our findings may also help to resolve the puzzling fact that advertising has little
effect on sales (e.g., Assmus, Farley & Lehmann 1984, Lodish, Abraham, Kalmenson,
Livelsberger, Lubetkin, Richardson & Steve 1995). Recall that sales are measured
as quantity sold times sales price. Since our results suggest that advertising has no
effect on perceived quality, it presumably has no effect on consumers’ willingness to
pay. On the contrary, by making consumers aware of more brands, advertising should
be procompetitive and put downward pressure on prices. Hence, if price decreases
sufficiently, then sales remain constant or even decrease in response to advertising
even if quantity increases.13 Investigating this question further presents a promising
venue for further research.

References
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2001), ‘A theory of political transition’, American
Economic Review 91(4), 938–963.
Ackerberg, D. (2001), ‘Empirically distinguishing between informative and prestige
effects of advertising’, Rand Journal of Economics 32(2), 316–333.
Anand, B. & Shachar, R. (2004), Advertising the matchmaker, Working paper, Harvard University, Cambridge.
Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991), ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations’, Review of Economic Studies 58, 277–297.
Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995), ‘Another look at instrumental variable estimation
of error component models’, Journal of Econometrics 68, 29–52.
Assmus, G., Farley, J. & Lehmann, D. (1984), ‘How advertising affects sales: Meta
analysis of econometric results’, Journal of Marketing Research 21(1), 65–74.
13

A long standing problem in estimating the effect of advertising on sales is the so-called data
interval bias (Clarke 1976). The impact of advertising is misestimated to the extent that the flow
of sales and the flow of advertising are not properly matched up over the course of a period. In our
setting, the dependent variables are a brand’s stocks of perceived quality and awareness. This may
mitigate the data interval bias because these stocks encompass all current and previous flows and
thus are more likely to pick up the impact of advertising.

33

Bass, F., Bruce, N., Majumdar, S. & Murthi, B. (2007), ‘Wearout effects of different advertising themes: A dynamic Bayesian model of the advertising-sales
relationship’, Marketing Science 26(2), 179–195.
Blackburn, J. & Clancy, K. (1982), LITMUS: A new product planning model, in
A. Zoltners, ed., ‘Marketing Planning Models’, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
pp. 43–62.
Blattberg, R. & Golanty, J. (1978), ‘Tracker: An early test market forecasting and
diagnostic model for new product planning’, Journal of Marketing Research
15, 192–202.
Blundell, R. & Bond, S. (1998), ‘Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic
panel data models’, Journal of Econometrics 87, 115–143.
Bond, S. (2002), Dynamic panel data models: A guide to micro data methods and
practice, Working paper CWP09/02, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Boyer, M. & Moreaux, M. (1999), ‘Strategic underinvestment in informative advertising: The cases of substitutes and complements’, Canadian Journal of Economics
32(3), 654–672.
Clarke, D. (1976), ‘Econometric measurement of the duration of advertising effect on
sales’, Journal of Marketing Research 13(4), 345–357.
Doganoglu, T. & Klapper, D. (2006), ‘Goodwill and dynamic advertising strategies’,
Quantitative Marketing and Economics 4(1), 5–29.
Doraszelski, U. & Markovich, S. (2007), ‘Advertising dynamics and competitive advantage’, Rand Journal of Economics 38(3), 557–592.
Dube, J., Hitsch, G. & Manchanda, P. (2005), ‘An empirical model of advertising
dynamics’, Quantitative Marketing and Economics 3, 107–144.
Durlauf, S., Johnson, P. & Temple, J. (2005), Growth econometrics, in P. Aghion &
S. Durlauf, eds, ‘Handbook of Econometric Growth’, Vol. 1A, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, pp. 555–677.
Erdem, T., Keane, M. & Sun, B. (2008), ‘The impact of advertising on consumer price
sensitivity in experience goods markets’, Quantitative Marketing and Economics
6(2), 139–176.
Fershtman, C. & Muller, E. (1993), ‘The benefits of being small: Duopolistic competition with market segmentation’, Review of Industrial Organization 8, 101–111.
Hayashi, F. (2000), Econometrics, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Kadiyali, V. (1996), ‘Entry, its deterrence, and its accommodaton: A study of the
U.S. photographic film industry’, Rand Journal of Economics 27(3), 452–478.
34

Kirmani, A. (1990), ‘The effect of perceived advertising costs on brand perceptions’,
Journal of Consumer Research 17(2), 160–171.
Kirmani, A. & Wright, P. (1989), ‘Money talks: Perceived advertising expense and
expected product quality’, Journal of Consumer Research 16(1), 344–353.
Little, J. (1975), ‘Brandaid: A marketing mix model, part 1-structure’, Operations
Research 23, 628–655.
Lodish, L., Abraham, M., Kalmenson, S., Livelsberger, J., Lubetkin, B., Richardson,
B. & Steve, M. (1995), ‘How advertising works: A meta-analysis of 389 real
world split cable TV advertising experiments’, Journal of Marketing Research
32, 125–139.
Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J. (1986), ‘Price and advertising signals of product quality’,
Journal of Political Economy 94(4), 796–821.
Mitra, A. & Lynch, J. (1995), ‘Toward a reconciliation of market power and information theories of advertising effects on price elasticity’, Journal of Consumer
Research 21(4), 644–649.
Moorthy, S. & Hawkins, S. (2005), ‘Advertising repetition and quality perception’,
Journal of Business Research 58(3), 354–360.
Moorthy, S. & Zhao, H. (2000), ‘Advertising spending and perceived quality’, Marketing Letters 11(3), 221–233.
Naik, P., Mantrala, M. & Sawyer, A. (1998), ‘Planning media schedules in the presence
of dynamic advertising quality’, Marketing Science 17(3), 214–235.
Narayanan, S. & Manchanda, P. (2008), ‘Heterogeneous learning and the targeting of
marketing communication for new products’, Marketing Science forthcoming.
Narayanan, S., Manchanda, P. & Chintagunta, P. (2005), ‘Temporal differences in
the role of marketing communicating for new product categories’, Journal of
Marketing Research 42, 278–291.
Nedungadi, P. (1990), ‘Recall and consumer consideration sets: Influencing choice
without altering brand evaluations’, Journal of Consumer Research 17(3), 263–
276.
Nelson, P. (1970), ‘Advertising and consumer behavior’, Journal of Political Economy
78(2), 311–329.
Nelson, P. (1974), ‘Advertising as information’, Journal of Political Economy
82(4), 729–754.
Nerlove, M. & Arrow, K. (1962), ‘Optimal advertising policy under dynamic considerations’, Economica 29(114), 129–142.
35

Roodman, D. (2007), How to do xtabond2: An introduction to “difference” and
“system” GMM in Stata, Working paper no. 103, Center for Global Development,
Washington.
Shachar, R. & Anand, B. (1998), ‘The effectiveness and targeting of television advertising’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 7, 363–396.
Sovinsky Goeree, M. (2008), ‘Limited information and advertising in the US personal
computer industry’, Econometrica 76(5), 1017–1074.
Stigler, G. (1961), ‘The economics of information’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
69(3), 213–225.
Sutton, J. (1991), Sunk costs and market structure, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Tellis, G. & Fornell, C. (1988), ‘Relationship between advertising and product quality
over the product life cycle: A contingency theory’, Journal of Marketing Research
25(1), 64–71.
Telser, L. (1964), ‘Advertising and competition’, Journal of Political Economy
72(6), 537–562.
Vidale, M. & Wolfe, H. (1957), ‘An operations research study of sales response to
advertising’, Operations Research 5(3), 370–381.
Windmeijer, F. (2005), ‘A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient
two-step GMM estimators’, Journal of Econometrics 126(1), 25–51.
Wooldridge, J. (2002), Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, MIT
Press, Cambridge.
Zajonc, R. (1968), ‘Attitudinal effects of mere exposure’, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 9(2), 1–27.
Zhang, J. & Li, H. (2007), ‘Do high birth rates hamper economic growth?’, Review
of Economics and Statistics 89(1), 110–117.

36

